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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAHf

:

Plaintiff-Respondent#:
v.

:

MARIO SOTO,

:

Case No. 870597-CA

Category No. 2

Defendant-Appellant. :
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a conviction of theft, a thirddegree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-404 (1978),
in the Second Judicial District Court.

This Court has

jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. S 78-2a3(2) (e) (1987).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
1.

Whether sufficient evidence was adduced at trial to

sustain defendant's conviction for theft.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-404 (1978):

"A person commits

theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over the
property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof."
S T A T S ^ T QF THE CAgE
Defendant/ Mario Soto, was charged by information with
theftf a third-degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 766-404 (1978) (R. 1). Defendant was convicted in a trial by jury
held on October 23 and 26, 1987, in the Second Judicial District
Court, the Honorable John F. Wahlquist presiding (R. 13-16).

On

November 18, 1987, Judge Wahlquist sentenced defendant to the Utah
State Prison for a term not to exceed five years (R. 32).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On August 8, 1987, at approximately 4:00 a.m., Officers
Stewart and Zaugg of the Ogden City police department were
dispatched, in response to a call from an area resident, to a
burglary in progress in the back lot of Wilkinson Supply Company
(T. 19-20, 37-38).*
Officer Zaugg, arriving first, approached the back lot
of Wilkinson Supply Company and heard at least one person climb
the fence, hit the ground and start to run (T. 42). He ran to the
location of the noise and observed three lawn mowers outside a
locked security fence (T. 40, 42). From that area he saw two
individuals, only 15-20 yards away, running side by side down a
nearby alley (T. 42-43) .

He got a clear view of each individual

while shining his flashlight at them (T. 42-43).

Officer Zaugg,

who was wearing a lapel microphone on his shirt, immediately
reported his position as he began pursuit (T. 43).
While attempting to negotiate a fence, one suspect (not
the defendant) fell and was apprehended by Officer Zaugg (T. 45)•
Officer Zaugg, who was then in two-way communication with Officer
Stewart, radioed his current position and the direction of the
suspect who was still fleeing (T. 48, 57). After handcuffing and
taking the first suspect into custody, Officer Zaugg resumed
pursuit of the fleeing suspect (T. 48)•

1

The transcript to the present appeal in not numbered into the
record. All references denoted by (T. ) refer to the page
number as found in the trial transcript.
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Officer Stewart, who was able to listen to Officer
Zaugg1s narrative of events before beginning two-way
communication, was informed that the fleeing suspect was headed
southbound through some houses midway through the block (T. 23). 2
Officer Stewart, already in the area described, spotted an
individual running who matched the description given by Officer
Zaugg,3 and began foot pursuit (T. 24-25).

Officer Stewart

observed the suspect enter a back yard which was fenced in on all
sides (T. 25-26, 50).
When Officer Stewart was halfway across the driveway
toward the back of the house, Officer Zaugg came around the corner
of the house and together both officers proceeded into the back
yard to search for the suspect (T. 27, 50). Officer Stewart
noticed some movement and then saw a person's legs sticking out
from underneath a camper trailer (T. 27, 51). Officer Zaugg
recognized the person who was pulled out from underneath the
trailer as being the same person he had chased through the alley
(T. 55) .
After taking defendant into custody, the officers
escorted the suspects back to Wilkinson Supply in order to
continue their investigation (T. 29, 52). The officers observed
2

Wilkinson Supply Company is located on 3021 Grant Ave. in Ogden
(T. 23). Events described throughout the record generally occur
between the east and west boundries of Wall Ave and Washington
Blvd., and the north and south boundries of 31st St. and 29th St.
3 Officer Stewart also testified that during this time (between
4:00 and 4:15 a.m.) he had not seen anybody in the area prior to
observing the suspect. Additionally, he testified that he had
not seen any cars traveling in the area of Grant and Patterson
where the events were taking place (T. 24)•
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that the bottom of the gate to the fence had been pulled away,
leaving a gap of one to two-and-half feet in the fence line, and
that three lawn mowers had been removed from the fenced area. (T.
29-30, 52-53).
Officer Stewart read defendant his Miranda rights,
which defendant indicated he understood and then waived (T. 31-31,
53-54) • At first defendant was evasive in answering questions,
but as the interview progressed and after being confronted with
the evidence, he attempted to provide an explanation (T. 32).
Eventually defendant admitted to being at the scene and committing
the theft (T. 36, 54), but claimed that he and the other arrested
person were coerced into doing it by three or four white males who
had threatened them earlier (T. 34, 54). When questioned further,
defendant could not explain where he was supposed to meet these
individuals, how they were supposed to contact him, who they were,
or provide any description of them whatsoever (T. 34, &££., 54-55).
Notably, defendant never denied being at the scene or what his
intentions were while there (T. 36).
Defendants testimony at trial differed substantially
from the explanation he gave officers on the night of the offense.
At trial, defendant testified that it was sheer coincidence that
he happened to be in the area when the police observed him (T. 8587).

Defendant claimed that he was in the area after being at a

party (T. 69-70), and that while at the party, he got into an
argument with his girlfriend, Josette Sanchez (T. 71, 113)•
During the argument, Ms. Sanchez threatened to call the police if
defendant hit her (T. 72, 118, 120). Because of the argument, Ms.
Sanchez drove away and left the defendant to walk home.
-4-

Defendant claimed that he began to walk to his home in
Riverdale;

however, the route he followed took him towards

Wilkinson Supply, not towards his home (T. 85). Defendant
explained that he ran from the police because he was afraid that
Ms. Sanchez had called the police (T. 71-72, 75). Crossexamination of the defendant and his girlfriend revealed the
inconsistencies of defendant's testimony.

Most notably, that the

alleged threat was that Ms. Sanchez would call the police i£
defendant hit her.

Because defendant never hit her, there was no

reason for defendant to believe that the police wanted to arrest
him for that incident (R. 88-89, 119-120).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The standard articulated by the Utah Supreme Court for
reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence is that the
evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom will be
viewed in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict; to set
aside a jury verdict, the evidence must be "sufficiently
inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must
have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty
of the crime of which he was convicted."
P.2d 295, 295 (Utah 1986).

State v. Gutierrez, 714

Moreover, it is the exclusive province

of the jury to judge the credibility of the witnesses and the
weight of the evidence.
A review of the record in the present case shows that
there is abundant evidence to support each of the requisite
elements for theft and sustain defendant's conviction.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE WAS ADDUCED AT TRIAL TO
SUSTAIN DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION FOR THEFT.
The standard of review applied to cases where the
sufficiency of the evidence is challenged has been firmly
established by the Utah Supreme Court.

The Court has stated:

Upon review of the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting a conviction, we will
reverse only when such evidence is
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently
improbable that reasonable minds must have
entertained a reasonable doubt that the
defendant is guilty of the crime of which he
was convicted. State v. Roberts* Utah, 711
P.2d 235 (1985); State v. Petree, Utah, 659
P.2d 443 (1983). Accordingly, we view the
evidence, and all reasonable inferences
therefrom, in the light most favorable to the
verdict. State v. Heaps* Utah 711 P.2d 257
(1985). So long as there is some evidence
from which findings of all the requisite
elements of the offense can reasonably be
made, the conviction will be affirmed. State
v. Booker. Utah, 709 P.2d 342 (1985).

State v, Gutierrez, 714 p.2d 295, 295 (Utah 1986).
Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-404 (1978) provides, "A person
commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over
the property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof."
£££, State v. Davis. 689 P.2d 5 (Utah 1984).

Accordingly, to

properly convict the defendant, the jury was obligated to make the
following findings, as detailed in jury instruction number six.
1)

That on or about the 8th day August,
1987, in Weber County, Utah, the
following events occurred.

2)

At the above time and place, Wilkinson
Farm Supply had lawful control and
possession of three lawn mowers (one
Snapper, one Jacobson, and one Honda) and
had stored them in a fenced enclosure.
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3)

At the above time and place, the
defendant, acting alone or in conjunction
with another, removed the three lawn
mowers from the enclosure with an intent
to permanently deprive the true owners
and/or Wilkinson Lawn Supply of their
property*

4)

That the lawn movers [sic] have a
combined value in excess of $250.
For
the purpose of the theft statutes, the
value of a second-hand lawn mower is what
the used lawn mower would sell for in the
community on a retail basis, as is.

(R. 20).
The record contains abundant evidence to support the
jury's findings for each of the requisite elements and to sustain
defendant's conviction.

Mark Wilkinson, owner of Wilkinson Supply Company, was
called as the prosecution's first witness (T. 4 ) . After
describing the layout of his store, including the fenced yard and
security measures taken by the store, Mr. Wilkinson testified that
he was "absolutely, positive" that the lawn mowers were inside the
fenced yard when the store was closed for business on August 7,
1987 (T. 5-6, 8-9). The testimony of Mr. Wilkinson is conclusive
evidence from which the jury could find that Wilkinson Supply
Company had control and lawful possession of the lawn mowers for
the date in question; the testimony of Mr. Wilkinson was
unchallenged and uncontroverted.

Even on cross-examination,

defense counsel did not challenge Wilkinson Supply's ownership,
control or possession of the mowers (£££, T. 14-18).

In short,

not only were there sufficient grounds for the jury to find that

-7-

Wilkinson Supply had control and lawful possession of the mowers,
there was absolutely no evidence which could support a finding to
the contrary.

B.

Pefendfln:LjcgiDflye<3 the Jtawn,jiK>wers fram
J^fi^eDgl^SAiig^tflUi an intent t<?
ih£_:tl)£ii--Pisp£iJty.

At trial Mark Wilkinson, Officer Zaugg, and Officer
Stewart each described how the gate to the fenced area had been
pulled back from the fence line creating a gap through which the
lawn mowers were removed (T. 8, 29-30, 52-53)•

Officer Zaugg

testified that as he approached the area, he heard at least one
individual climb the fence, hit the ground and start to run (T.
42).

Officer Zaugg ran to the area of the noise and was able see

two suspects, only 15-20 yards away, fleeing the scene (T. 42-43) .
He further testified that he was able to get a "clear view of each"
(T. 42-43).

After chasing and ultimately apprehending both

suspects, he identified the defendant as one of the two suspects
who ran from the crime scene (T. 55). This evidence, even if
viewed in a neutral manner rather than in a light most favorable to
the verdict, would be sufficient to sustain the jury's finding that
the defendant was involved in the theft.
In addition, both Officer Zaugg and Officer Stewart
testified that defendant confessed to the commission of the crime
when questioned at the scene (T. 36, 54). The evidence
overwhelmingly established that defendant, either by himself or in
conjunction with another, removed the lawn mowers from the fenced
area of Wilkinson Supply.
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Because an "intent to deprive" is a mental state which
is rarely susceptible of direct proof, the Utah Supreme Court has
held that an intent to deprive "need not be proved by direct
evidence, but may be inferred from the defendant's acts, conduct,
statements or from the circumstances,"

gta£$ Y^_PaV15* 689 P.2d 5,

12 (Utah 1984); AC££ld# Slaifi^x^ISaaSSQUi

704 P.2d 555, 558 (Utah

1985); SJtfliS_JLL-Bxfi£]iS, 631 P.2d 878, 881 (Utah 1981).

Sg£ 3l££,

£iai£_y*_.Myipl)y, 674 P.2d 1220, 1223 (Utah 1983).
In the present case, defendant's "intent to deprive" is
clearly established by his own statements, conduct, and the
surrounding circumstances.

As previously mentioned, Officers Zaugg

and Stewart related defendant's confession to the theft.

Officer

Zaugg testified:
Q: [Prosecutor] At any point where he had
admitted to you that he had gone there and
taken the lawn mowers out, did he ever change
his story after that?
A; [Officer Zaugg] No, he never, never
denied the fact of being there or what his
intention was for being there. Merely that
the people had threatened him . . . .
(T. 36). Officer Stewart testified:
He admitted to being at the scene, and also
stated that he was involved in the theft of
it, but he stated that something to the
effect that they were forced or coerced
into—into doing i t — •
(T. 54).
Besides the defendant's confession, as related by the
officers, his flight from the scene of a crime also creates a
possible inference from which an intent to deprive may properly be
found.

Jgfifi £ia.fc£_YA_Bal£S, 675 P.2d 573 (Utah 1983).
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The Utah

Supreme Court has consistently held that intent may properly be
inferred from circumstantial evidence.

Isaacson* 704 P.2d at 558;

PayJLSr 689 P.2d at 12; EXflfiliS r 631 P.2d at 881; £££ al££, MAliphy#
674 P.2d at 1223.
In sum, there is clearly more than "some evidence" from
which a finding supporting defendant's intent to deprive may be
found.

There isf in fact, overwhelming evidence.
That the defendant offered a different version of the

facts at trial should not dissuade this court from affirming the
verdict.

Even if this Court were to view the evidence as less

than wholly conclusive, or recognize contradictory evidence or
conflicting inferences, the verdict should be upheld.
flj0tt£ll# 649 P.2d 91, 97 (Utah 1982).

Siaifi-y^

In short, "on conflicting

evidence the Court is obliged to accept the version of the facts
which supports the verdict."

IsaaCfifiJQ 704 P.2d at 556, fiiiins

£ia:tS-y*_B£K£llr 649 P.2d 93 (Utah 1982).

c.

Ti)s-.iajflfD.iDi?»fiXfi«l)ad.a-.£flJDbiDfid«2alii£
in-£2££££-££-£2J5jQ.t

Mark Wilkinson, owner of Wilkinson Supply, testified
that he had been in business for nine years and during that entire
time had purchased and sold lawn mowers and, in fact, had worked
with these kinds of lawn mowers everyday.

He testified that he

was familiar with the condition of the three lawn mowers, and
judged their retail value to be $450. (T. 9-10, 12). Because this
was the only evidence presented at trial respecting the value of
the lawn mowers, the jury again not only had an adequate basis for
finding the value to be in excess of $250, any other finding would
have been unsupported by the evidence.
-10-

The Utah Supreme Court has held t h a t by merely being an
owner, one i s presumed to be f a m i l i a r with the value of h i s
p o s s e s s i o n s and i s competent to t e s t i f y on the present market
value of h i s property.

S:fcflJt£_*jL_Elll££ll# 711 P.2d 243, 245 (Utah

1985) CJLtins JSJLflJfcfi-^-fiaJLEiS # 30 Utah 2d 439, 441, 519 P.2d 247,
248 (1974); Sialfi-Yx-BalifiDbSiafilr 652 P.2d 927, 931 (Utah 1982).
In Eiircfillr the court held that an apartment manager who was
familiar with the value and condition of the property in question,
was in a position sufficiently analogous to that of an owner to
permit the apartment managers testimony regarding the value of
the property.

In the present case, Mr. Wilkinson, like the

apartment manager, was familiar with the value and condition of
the items and was, therefore, competent to testify to the value of
the lawn mowers. Moreover, where there is no evidence to
contradict the valuation of the property there is ample evidence
to support the jury's verdict.

PiliSfill 711 P.2d at 245.

£QN£LU£IQN
On the basis of the evidence adduced at trial, this
Court should affirm defendant's conviction for theft.

"It is the

exclusive function of the jury to weigh the evidence and to
determine the credibility of the witnesses, and it is not within
the prerogative of this Court to substitute its judgement for that
of the fact-finder."
1980)*

StaJfc£_.yA_LajWB, 606 P.2d 229, 231 (Utah

When sufficiency of the evidence is challenged, it is well

settled that the reviewing court is obligated to view the
evidence, and all reasonable inferences therefrom, in the light
most favorable to the verdict. 5JtflJtfi-i?x«Bfiapsr 711 P.2d 257 (Utah

11-

1985).

So long a s t h e r e i s some evidence from which f i n d i n g s of

a l l t h e r e q u i s i t e e l e m e n t s of t h e o f f e n s e s can r e a s o n a b l y by made,
the c o n v i c t i o n should be a f f i r m e d .

SJtaifi-ijLBfiflJssx,

709 P. 2d 342

(Utah 1 9 8 5 ) .
The evidence in the present case is overwhelming.

With

the added presumption in favor of the jury's findings, the
evidence clearly mandates that this Court affirm the defendant's
conviction for theft.
Based on the foregoing arguments, the State
respectfully requests that the defendant's conviction be affirmed.
Dated this

day of May, 1988.
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General

JARA BEARNS
Ad^istant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
CEETIFICAIE^QE.MAILINS
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of
the foregoing Brief of Respondent were mailed, postage prepaid, to
Robert L. Froerer, Attorney for Defendant, 2568 Washington Blvd.,
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of May, 1988.
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